Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro announced at the mid-November ASEAN summit in Manila that the goal of finalizing a code of conduct for the South China Sea by 2026 has been abandoned. Although approximately 80% of the proposed text had been negotiated, key areas of dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members remained unresolved, preventing a breakthrough during the current presidency.
The South China Sea is a region of significant strategic competition, housing vital shipping routes, rich fishing grounds, and potential oil and gas reserves. China’s expansive claims, often illustrated by the so-called Nine-Dash Line, overlap with the maritime interests of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. A code of conduct aims to establish rules for interactions among parties and prevent maritime incidents from escalating, but disagreements persist over its legal binding nature and geographic scope.
Experts indicate that China’s refusal to commit to a legally binding agreement is a strategic calculation. Andreas Ufen, a political scientist at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), noted that Beijing has little incentive to restrict its own maneuverability as long as it can effectively pursue its regional interests without legal constraints. Specific unresolved issues include whether the Paracel Islands (known as Xisha in China and Hoang Sa in Vietnam) should fall under the code’s jurisdiction, as Hanoi seeks to include them while Beijing rejects the move.
Felix Heiduk, head of the Asia research division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), highlighted that there is no consensus on whether the agreement should be legally binding. While China and ASEAN have been negotiating for 12 years without major progress, many ASEAN nations also harbor reservations about the ratification process required for binding treaties under international law. Furthermore, defining what constitutes an ‘incident’—ranging from coast guard water cannon use to blockades of supply vessels—remains controversial and is critical to the code’s eventual effectiveness.
Interests within the ASEAN bloc are not uniform. While the Philippines and Vietnam strongly oppose China’s activities in the region, countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia adopt a more restrained approach. Meanwhile, Cambodia and Laos, which lack territorial claims in the South China Sea and maintain close economic ties with Beijing, have been less vocal. Despite these diverging positions, surrounding nations continue to invest in their naval capabilities, with China spending significantly more than other regional nations combined.
Will the next summit pick up where Manila left off, or is this just a permanent stalemate now?
It is shocking how little progress they made. The lack of consensus among ASEAN members really stalled everything.
Twelve years of negotiations and still nothing. China simply has no incentive to be bound by rules.